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Abstract
We here explore a “fully” lexicalized Tree-Adjoining
Grammar for discourse that takes the basic ele-
ments of a (monologic) discourse to be not simply
clauses, but larger structures that are anchored on
variously realized discourse cues. This link with
intra-sentential grammar suggests an account for dif-
ferent patterns of discourse cues, while the differ-
ent structures and operations suggest three sepa-
rate sources for elements of discourse meaning: (1) a
compositional semantics tied to the basic trees and
operations; (2) a presuppositional semantics carried
by cue phrases that freely adjoin to trees; and (3)
general inference, that draws additional, defeasible
conclusions that flesh out what is conveyed compo-
sitionally.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, researchers interested in ac-
counting for how elements combine in a discourse,
have taken to using the adjoining operation found
in Tree-Adjoining Grammar (TAG) (Gardent, 1994;
Gardent, 1997; Polanyi and van den Berg, 1996;
Schilder, 1997; van den Berg, 1996; Webber, 1991).
More recently, Cristea and Webber (1997) have ar-
gued that a Tree-Adjoining Grammar for discourse
would also need the substitution operation found in
a lexicalized TAG (Schabes, 1990). Here we move
further and explore a fully lexicalized TAG for dis-
course, allowing us to examine how the insights of
lexicalized grammars – that the basic elements of a
clause are not simply words, but structures that re-
flect a word’s role and syntactic/semantic scope –
carry over to discourse. We show how this suggests
explanations for such phenomena as the following:
• that arguments of a coherence relation can be
stretched “long distance” by intervening mate-
rial;
• that multiple discourse cues can appear in a sin-
gle sentence or even a single clause;
• that when discourse cues appear in the middle
of clauses, they contribute to coherence in more
specific ways;
• that coherence relations can vary in how and
when they are realized lexically.
One way of understanding the current work is
that it extrapolates from lexically-based views of
how structure and meaning are associated within a
sentence to how aspects of discourse structure and
meaning might be associated in similar ways. While
the idea that discourse-level mechanisms might re-
semble intra-sentential mechanisms has long been
an undercurrent within discourse research, we have
come to believe that the framework of lexicalized
grammar can be effectively used to demonstrate the
validity of this intuition. While we present the ideas
in terms of one well-known formalism – Lexicalized
TAG – other lexicalized formalisms such as CCG
(Steedman, 1996b) might prove equally useful for
expressing the same theoretical insights and imple-
menting them for discourse generation and/or inter-
pretation.
A superficial reading of the current proposal might
suggest that it is merely a simple embedding of RST
(Mann and Thompson, 1988) in TAG. That would
be incorrect. First, the primary feature of a fully
lexicalized TAG is that each elementary tree in the
grammar has an anchor that indexes the tree and
defines its syntactic/semantic scope. Here, we posit
a set of initial (non-recursive) trees, whose anchor is
a discourse cue. Structurally, some initial trees re-
semble the nucleus-satellite structures of RST, and
some, its joint schema. But the resemblence is only
superficial, as initial trees have a purely composi-
tional semantics that makes no assumptions about
what the speaker is trying to do.1
Secondly, there is a single auxiliary tree whose
semantics corresponds simply to continuing the de-
scription conveyed by the structure to which it is
adjoined. Any additional inferences that a listener
draws from the resulting adjacency are defeasible,
1The LTAG formalism itself allows an elementary tree to
be associated with a meaning that is not compositional with
respect to its sub-parts. This is used, for example, for asso-
ciating meaning with syntactically-flexible idioms. However,
we have not found the need to exploit this possibility for dis-
course, though we leave open the possibility.
and may be cancelled or corrected by material in the
subsequent discourse. Our proposal thus factors the
combinability of elementary discourse clauses from
inferences that may then be drawn, thus providing
a tool for sorting out different semantic processes in
discourse, instead of lumping them into a single cat-
egory. Many of these inferences have been given the
status of discourse relations in RST. However, we
argue in Section 2.3 that one can gain from distin-
guishing what is derived compositionally from what
is derived inferentially.
Thirdly, there are auxiliary trees for other dis-
course cues, that can adjoin to either initial trees
or auxiliary trees. These discourse cues contribute
meaning (and coherence) through their presupposi-
tions or assertions or both. They can thereby serve
to constrain the range of inferences that a listener
might draw when a description is extended, limit-
ing them to ones compatible with the contribution
of the discourse cue. Similarly, a discourse cue ad-
joined to an initial tree can either further specify the
compositional meaning of the related units or con-
strain how that initial tree can be used in extending
another description. This will explain how several
discourse cues can appear in the same sentence or
even the same clause, each contributing to either
the compositional or presuppositional semantics of
the discourse (Section 2.2).
This is still a “work in progress”, with many open
questions. However, it may still pique the interest
of two historically distinct groups: it may stimu-
late people working on syntax to look beyond the
clause for phenomena familiar to them within it,
while it may help people working on discourse to
ground their claims and insights in more traditional
varieties of linguistic formalisms.
2 Elements of a Lexicalized TAG for
Discourse
A lexicalized TAG begins with the notion of a lexi-
cal anchor, which can have one or more associated
tree structures. For example, the verb likes anchors
one tree corresponding to John likes apples, another
corresponding to the topicalized construction Ap-
ples John likes, and a third corresponding to the
passive construction Apples are liked by John. All
in all, there is a tree for each minimal syntactic
construction in which likes can appear, all sharing
the same predicate-argument structure. This syn-
tactic/semantic encapsulation is possible because of
the extended domain of locality of LTAG. Trees in
such a tree family may differ in being licensed by dif-
ferent states of the discourse (i.e., information struc-
ture (Steedman, 1996a)).
A lexicalized TAG contains two kinds of elemen-
tary trees: initial (non-recursive) trees that reflect
basic functor-argument dependencies and auxiliary
trees that introduce recursion and allow elementary
trees to be modified and/or elaborated. In our lex-
icalized discourse TAG, we have so far found the
need to posit only two types of initial tree families
(Section 2.1) and two types of auxiliary trees (Sec-
tion 2.2). While the resulting grammar is thus very
simple – only one type, only binary predicates – it
so far appears expressively adequate.
2.1 Initial Trees
Subordinate conjunctions are one major class of dis-
course cues, and clause-level LTAG already provides
an account of subordinate clauses with overt sub-
ordinate conjunctions. Its “verb-centric” account
in (XTAG-Group, 1995) appropriately treats sub-
ordinate clauses as adjuncts – i.e., auxiliary trees.
However, from a discourse perspective, we treat two
clauses connected by a subordinate conjunction as
an initial tree whose compositional semantics re-
flect the subordinate conjunction as predicate (or
“functor”) and the clauses as arguments. There is
an initial tree for each minimal structural pattern
of main clause and subordinate clause, including
those shown in Figure 1. All such trees share the
same predicate (functor) argument structure. As in
clause-level tree families, each pattern may have dif-
ferent preconditions on its use that reflect the cur-
rent state of the discourse (i.e., information struc-
ture). For example, it has been noted that a “when”
clause in initial position presupposes that the sit-
uation described therein is in the hearer’s discourse
model (or can be so accommodated), while a “when”
clause coming after the main clause is not so con-
strained.
In Section 3, we discuss reasons for taking the lex-
ical anchors of these initial trees to be feature struc-
tures that may correspond to one or more subordi-
nate conjunctions such as “if” and “when”. Here we
just take them to be specific lexical items.
Now one reason for taking something to be an ini-
tial tree is that it has local dependencies that can
be stretched long-distance. For example, the depen-
dency between apples and likes in both John likes
apples and apples John likes is localized in all the
trees for likes. It can be stretched, however, long-
distance as in Apples, Bill thinks John may like. In
(Cristea and Webber, 1997), we have shown that
the same long-distance stretching of dependencies
occurs with both subordinate clauses (Ex. 1) and
parallel constructions (Ex. 2) – e.g.
1. a. Although John is very generous,
b. giving money to whoever asks,
c. when you actually need it,
d. you’ll see that he’s a bugger to find.
2. a. On the one hand, John is very generous.
b. For example, suppose you needed some
money.
(d)
S S
S
S S
S
SS
subconj subconj(a) (b) S
VP
VP
subconj
S
(c)
NP
Figure 1: Initial Trees (a-c) belong to the tree family for a subordinate conjunction. The symbol ↓ indicates
a substitution site, while [ ] stands for a particular subordinate conjunction and its feature structure. (d) is
the initial tree for a parallel construction.
c. You would just have to ask for it.
d. On the other hand, he’s a bugger to find.
Thus here we also posit an initial tree for paral-
lel structures (Figure 1d). Since there are different
ways in which entities are taken to be parallel, we
currently assume a different initial tree for contrast
(“on the one hand” . . . “on the other hand” . . . ), dis-
junction (“either” . . . “or” . . . ), addition (“not only”
. . . “but also” . . . ), and concession (“admittedly”
. . . “but” . . . ). Such trees have a pair of anchors
with two main properties.
The first is that their lexical realization seems
optional. In contrastive cases, a medial anchor
such as “on the other hand” often appears lexical-
ized without an initial phrase such as “on the one
hand”. In fact, there are more cases of this in the
Brown Corpus than of the two appearing together.
Also optional is the realization of the initial anchor
in disjunction (omitting “either”), addition (omit-
ting “not only”), and concession (omitting “admit-
tedly”). But we have recently noted cases where
only the initial anchor is realized lexically but not
the medial anchor, although this is less common:
Not only have they [Rauschenberg’s blueprints]
survived. The process of their creation was
recorded by Life magazine in April 1951. (New
York Review of Books, 6 November 1997, p.8)
The second property is that the medial anchor ap-
pears realizable in multiple ways. Cristea and Web-
ber (1997) report that, of the eleven instances of “on
the one hand” found in the Brown Corpus, four have
their contrasting item cued by something other than
“on the other (hand)” – including “but” and “at the
same time”:
3. On the one hand, the Public Health Service de-
clared as recently as October 26 that present
radiation levels resulting from the Soviet shots
“do not warrant undue public concern” or
any action to limit the intake of radioactive
substances by individuals or large population
groups anywhere in the Aj. But the PHS con-
ceded . . . .(cb21)
4. Brooklyn College students have an ambivalent
attitude toward their school. On the one hand,
there is a sense of not having moved beyond
the ambiance of their high school. This is par-
ticularly acute for those who attended Mid-
wood High School directly across the street
from Brooklyn College. They have a sense of
marginality at being denied that special badge
of status, the out-of-town school. At the same
time, there is a good deal of self-congratulation
at attending a good college . . . (cf25)
Other examples occur with “on the other extreme”
and “at the other extreme” – cf.
5. On the one hand we have the “All you have to
do is buy it” brigade who seem to think the only
problem is that we haven’t gone and “done it”.
On the other extreme there are groups who
think if it has been explored theoretically then
it’s been done.
In Section 3, we will argue that both these properties
can be accommodated by treating the lexical anchors
of these initial trees as feature structures.
2.2 Auxiliary Trees
Discourse cues other than subordinate conjunctions
are either adverbs (adverbial phrases) or conjunc-
tions. In XTAG (1995), adverbials are handled as
simple auxiliary trees (Figure 2a-b). We do the same
here, associating each cue with a feature structure
that indicates its semantic properties for reasons to
be discussed in Section 3. Semantically, such auxil-
iary trees can be used to elaborate or clarify the dis-
course relation holding between two discourse units.
This may result in the phenomenon of there being
more than one discourse cue in a sentence, as in
6. Stephen Brook, in Class: Knowing your place
in modern Britain, begins promisingly with
*{S, VP}
cue (a)
*
{S, VP}
cue(b)
*
(c)
S
cue
Figure 2: Auxiliary Trees. (a) and (b) are auxiliary trees in the tree family for adverbial discourse cues,
which serve to modify or constrain the relation holding between discourse units. Trees in the family may be
rooted on S or VP. The symbol ∗ indicates the foot node of the auxiliary tree. (c) is the auxiliary tree for
basic elaboration.
the proposition that “class distinction and
class consciousness – they are both with
us”.. . . Brook then, however, runs into trou-
ble because he feels obliged to provide a theory
. . . .
7. Although the episodic construction of the
book often makes it difficult to follow, it nev-
ertheless makes devastating reading.
We will discuss the semantics of such examples
shortly, and also the conjunctions “so” and “but”.
As noted in Section 1, an auxiliary tree (here
shown in Figure 2c) is used to adjoin to a structure
and continue the description of the entity (object,
event, situation, state, etc.) that it conveys. Such
a tree would be used in the derivation of a simple
discourse such as:
8. John went to the zoo. He took his cell phone
with him.
Here, the foot node of the auxiliary tree in Figure 2c
would be adjoined to the root of the tree for the first
clause, and its substitution site filled by the tree for
the second. The tree’s anchor may have no lexi-
cal realization (as here, between main clauses), or it
may be realized by “and” (as in embedded clauses
– e.g. “Fred believes that John went to the zoo and
that he took his cell phone with him”). The compo-
sitional meaning associated with adjoining this tree
is simply that the meaning of the second clause con-
tinues the description of the same entity as the first.
Other aspects of meaning – such as there being a
causal connection or temporal relation between its
sub-parts, or an evidential relation between them –
would be derived inferentially, and hence possibly be
found inconsistent, given the subsequent discourse.
When an adverbial discourse cue is adjoined to a
clause, it can constrain how the clause can be inter-
preted as continuing the already-started description
– for example,
9. John went to the zoo. However, he took his
cell phone with him.
Following Knott and others (1996), we take the se-
mantics of such discourse cues to be presupposi-
tional. For example, according to Knott, “however”
presupposes the existence of a (shared) defeasible
rule, some or all of whose antecedents are licensed
by the previous discourse, but which fails to hold ei-
ther because the clause so marked contradicts either
the conclusion or an antecedent. In Example (9),
the defeasible rule might be something like
When people go to the zoo, they leave their
work behind.
So the clause marked by “however” in (9) both con-
tinues the description of the event of John’s going to
the zoo (compositional semantics) and conveys that
the above rule fails to hold because its conclusion is
contradicted (presuppositional semantics).
Of course, since these relation-modifying auxiliary
trees are adverbials, they can, at least in English, be
adjoined elsewhere in the structure, not just at the
anchor – e.g.
10. Cracked and broken plastic tableware will at-
tract germs, so it should be thrown away, never
mended. Plastic furniture and toys, however,
can be repaired successfully with the appropri-
ate adhesive.
We speculate that such medially-occuring discourse
cues (of which we are acquiring a growing corpus of
naturally-occuring examples) occur at the boundary
between a sentence’s topic or theme (i.e., the ques-
tion under discussion) and its comment or rheme
(i.e., the contribution made towards that question)
(Steedman, 1996a). There are then three possibili-
ties:
• The cue merely makes the boundary explicit,
while its presuppositional semantics remains
tied to the proposition as a whole;
• The presuppositional semantics of the cue
is grounded in whichever informational unit
(theme or rheme) occurs to its left;
• The presuppositional semantics of the cue is
grounded in the theme (wherever it occurs),
specifying how the theme links to the discourse
(i.e., how it is the question under discussion).
Deciding among these alternatives requires more
time for thought and analysis of both constructed
and such “naturally-occuring” examples as
11. A soldering iron is a much more specialized tool,
which you will rarely need. If the occasion
does arise when you need to solder two pieces of
metal together, however, choose a large elec-
tric soldering iron with a tapered head.
and Examples (6) and (7) above. In (11), the sub-
ordinate clause itself is the theme. Such examples
as (7) and (11) call into question RST’s assump-
tion that satellites, which these subordinate clauses
would be taken to be, can be omitted without a great
change in meaning to a discourse. These certainly
cannot.
Another open question (but more of a technical
detail) is the appropriate handling of conjunctions
such as “so” and “but”. On the one hand, their se-
mantics can best be seen as presuppositional – pre-
supposing a defeasible rule grounded in the previous
discourse that succeeds in the case of “so” and fails
in the case of “but” (Knott, 1996). On the other
hand, they can only occur in the same position as
“and”, which we treat as a possible lexical realiza-
tion of the anchor of the description-extending aux-
iliary tree, but which is not presuppositional. It is
not yet clear to us which is the more appropriate
way to treat them.
2.3 Compositional vs. Inferential
Semantics
One consequence of this approach is that clauses
linked by an explicit subordinate conjunction have
a different structural analysis than do clauses that
are simply adjacent. This might appear problematic
because the perceived meaning of such discourses is
usually the same. For example,
12. The City Council refused the women a permit
because they feared violence.
13. The City Council refused the women a permit.
They feared violence.
In our approach, (12) derives from the initial tree
given in Figure 3a, while (13) derives from adjoining
an auxiliary tree (Figure 3b) to the tree for the first
clause and substituting the tree for the second clause
at ↓. Herein lies the difference between the two: In
(12), the causal connection is derived composition-
ally, while in (13), one infers from the second utter-
ance continuing the description started in the first,
that the speaker intends the situation described in
the second utterance to serve as an explanation for
that described in the first. Thus, the causal connec-
tion is defeasible in (13) but not in (12). This can
be seen by trying to continue each with “But that
wasn’t the reason for their refusal.” The extended
version of (12) seems ill-formed, while the extended
version of (13) seems perfectly coherent.
Another reason for distinguishing a limited com-
positional semantics from an open inferential seman-
tics is illustrated by the following example:
14. My car won’t start. It may be out of gas.
An RST analysis would simply decide what rela-
tion held between the two clauses – perhaps non-
volitional cause. However, non-volitional cause does
not capture the different modal status of the two
clauses, which in turn affects the modal status of
the perceived relation: it is the car’s possibly being
out of gas that is possibly the cause of its not start-
ing. We believe it is more systematic to just decide
what description is being continued (here, the one
begun in the first clause) and then derive further
inferences that reflect the different modal status of
the two clauses. That the above inference is defea-
sible can be seen by continuing the discourse in (14)
with “But that’s not a possible reason for its not
starting”.
2.4 Brief Example
Here we illustrate our approach by considering Ex-
ample 9 (repeated below) in more detail.
9. John went to the zoo. However, he took his cell
phone with him.
Three types of elements participate in the analysis:
(1) the syntactic analyses (trees) of the two clauses
(“John went to the zoo, “he took his cell phone with
him”) labelled α and β in in Figure 4., along with
their respective meanings (call them p1(j) and p2(j));
(2) the auxiliary tree for the discourse cue “how-
ever”, labelled γ, along with its feature structure;
and (3) the description-extending auxiliary tree la-
belled δ.
As the derivation in Figure 4 (below the arrow)
shows, γ adjoins at the root of α, β substitutes into
δ, and δ adjoins at the root of β. The semantics is
as described earlier in Section 2.2.
3 Cue Phrases as Feature Structures
(Knott, 1996)
Earlier we noted that there was benefit to be gained
from taking the anchors of elementary trees to be
feature structures into which discourse cues (whose
semantics was also in terms of feature structures)
could substitute. Here we briefly argue why we be-
lieve this is so.
First, in viewing discourse cues in terms of feature
structures, we are following recent work by Knott
(1996; 1996). Knott’s study of the substitutabil-
ity patterns of discourse cues reveals that their four
common patterns – synonymy, exclusivity, hyper-
nymy/hyponymy and contingent substitutability –
(a)
*
(b)
because 0/
Figure 3: Trees used in the derivation of Ex. 12 and Ex. 13
[ ]
∗
γ 
however
δ
[ ] ∗
α
γ 
β
0
2.2
0
δ
sem = p1(j)
α
β
sem = p2(j) [ ]
however sem = p2(j)
sem = p1(j)
[ ]
Figure 4: Derivation of Example 9
can, by assuming inheritance (that, except for con-
tingent substitutability, a substitution pattern that
holds for a discourse cue also holds for all its hy-
ponyms), follow from interpreting cues in feature-
theoretic terms:
• If cue α is synonymous with cue β, they signal
the same values of the same features.
• If α is exclusive with β, they signal different
values of at least one feature.
• If α is a hypernym of β, β signals all the features
that α signals, as well as some features for which
α is undefined.
• If α and β are contingently substitutable, α and
β signal some of the same features, but α is also
defined for a feature for which β is undefined
and β is defined for a feature for which α is
undefined.
Drawing on the extensive literature devoted to in-
dividual cue phrases, Knott provided semantics for
some of these features in terms of preconditions on
their use and/or their communicative effects.
Following Knott in treating discourse cues in
terms of feature structures, it also appears benefi-
cial to treat tree anchors as feature structures as
well, distinct from those of discourse cues.
The reason for treating the anchor of subordinate
clause initial trees as feature structures is one of
representational efficiency: we can posit fewer such
trees if we take their anchors to be features struc-
tures that allow the (possibly contingent) substitu-
tion of any subordinate conjunction with a compat-
ible feature structure. For example, we can have
one tree whose anchor has the feature restricted-
situation, that can be realized as either “if” or
“when” in some texts, but only “when” in others
– e.g.:
15. Emergency parking regulations are in force
[when, if] more than six inches of snow has
fallen.
16. I found 30 new messages had arrived [when, *if]
I logged on this morning.
(Knott and Mellish, 1996) distinguish “if” and
“when” by their different values for the feature
modal status: “when” has the value actual, while “if”
has the value hypothetical. One can therefore say
that other semantic features in Ex. 16 conflict with
the value hypothetical, only allowing “when”. (N.B.
One could also take “when” as being unmarked for
modal status, its hypothetical reason begin synony-
mous with “whichever”. The conflict with “if” in
Ex. 16 would still follow.)
The argument for treating the pair of anchors of
parallel structures as feature structures follows from
the variability in the realization of the medial anchor
noted in Section 2.1. One way to account for this is
that the anchor has features separate from those of
the discourse cues. Any cue can then be used to
realize the anchor, as long as it is either
• less specific than the anchor, as in Ex. 3 – “but”
has few features in Knott’s taxonomy;
• more specific than the anchor, as in Ex. 5 –
“on the other extreme”, although it does not
appear in Knott’s taxonomy, intuitively appears
to mean more than just “side”.
• partially overlapping with the anchor, as in
Ex. 4 – “at the same time” has temporal
features, but does not seem intrinsically con-
trastive. This corresponds to Knott’s concept
of contingent substitutability.
It also appears as if the clause/discourse within the
scope of an anchor can either reinforce its features
(as in Ex. 17 below) or convey features of the anchor
when it is not itself realized lexically, as in Ex. 18:
17. On the one hand, according to Fred, John is
very generous. On the other hand, according
to everyone else, he will only give if he sees an
angle.
18. According to Fred, John is very generous. Ac-
cording to everyone else, he will only give if he
sees an angle.
But this part of our work is more speculative and
the subject of needed future work.
4 Summary
One way of seeing a grammar for discourse is as
a story grammar – i.e., a semantic grammar with
components marked for the role they play in the
story or some sub-part. Alternatively, a discourse
grammar can, like a sentence-level grammar, merely
specify how structural units fit together and how
the semantics of the whole would be derived. This
is one such grammar. While previous authors have
adopted only certain aspects of TAG or LTAG, here
we have explored the possibility of a “fully” lexi-
calized TAG for discourse, which allows to examine
how the basic insights of a lexicalized grammar carry
over to discourse.
Our proposal allows us to construct a smooth
bridge between syntactic clauses and discourse
clauses, each anchored on a lexical item (at times
empty but always carrying the appropriate features).
It also allows us to factor out three separate sources
for elements of discourse meaning, thus providing a
tool for sorting out different processes in discourse
and modeling them individually. As such, we believe
the approach provides some new insights and tools
for investigating discourse structure and discourse
relations.
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